From Nigeria to America: An Analysis of Terror Attacks in Nigeria for Security Managers

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, my sister's family and to my ever patient girlfriend, whose patience and support made this work possible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the members of my committee for their support, patience, and good humor. Their gentle but firm guidance has been appreciated. Professor Clements was particularly helpful in guiding me toward the qualitative methodology needed to complete my thesis. Professor Clements background and experience in Nigeria was a strong motivational factor for me to ask the hard questions about the security implications of protecting organizations operating in Muslim countries. Nigeria has been suffering from constant terrorist attacks for decades so there is a great deal of information to be learned from analyzing their attack methodology.   In pursuit of this information I looked at the incident summaries of the Global Terrorism Database as a security manager would by analyzing the attack frequency and the terrorist's methodology.

I found the course work throughout the security management program at American Military University to be very challenging and to have real world applications to the field of security. American Military University's education process helped me to look at terrorism and normal crime through the lens of a well prepared security manager.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

From Nigeria to America: An Analysis of Terror Attacks in Nigeria for Security Managers
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There is insufficient historically based analysis to explain how a radical Islamic group defeats public and private security efforts by destroying a country's leadership, businesses, key infrastructure and their religious opposition to create an Islamic state.

In order to conduct this research, information from nationally funded databases from the University of Maryland and the RAND Corporation was used. The first step was to build a combined information product that would yield enough information to accurately analyze the existing data.

The second step was to identify and compare the types of people that join a Muslim terrorist group by using information gathered and analyzed at the Combating Terrorism Center. Using their study of the Fighters of Lashkar-a-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan a comparison can be made with the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria. Their study's findings were used as a reference point to explain the recruiting, training and deployment cycle of a modern day state funded jihadist.

Keywords: Islamic, security, historical, jihadists

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I. Introduction

In the post 9/11 world that we live in today's security managers need to understand how Islamic terrorists destabilize a region, destroy organizations and kill people. The old days of leaving a night watchman in an overseas facility to "watch over" the building and its contents are over. Perception is finally catching up to reality in that any organization can be victimized at any time. Terrorists have always used crime to further their agenda and now terrorists are forcing security managers onto the frontlines of a global jihadist war. This thesis seeks to examine through historical perspective how modern day terrorists attack a nation's infrastructure and the commercial enterprises that make up the nation's economy.

Background

Since 1970 the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database (GTD) has collected 113,000 terrorists' events from around the world and cataloged them for statistical analysis. As Islamic terrorism spreads across the globe security managers are left struggling to defend their companies against increasingly violent attacks. The economic losses suffered by a country battling Islamic terrorists can be staggering. Not only does a country spend excessive amounts of money defending itself, but it passes on those costs to its taxpayers and the private businesses operating inside its borders. In a broader sense jihad is the same concept as economic terrorism in that the jihadist seek to destroy the existing economic base for a nation's civil authority. Security managers in this ever threatening operational environment will have to work harder than ever before to secure facilities, safeguard lives and protect the organization's reputation. Security managers will also have to reach out to their employees, corporate neighbors, public sector partners and regional

neighbors to better secure their facilities. Local law enforcement relationships will have to be reexamined in order to better support local law enforcement efforts.

Problem Statement

There is insufficient historically based analysis to explain how a radical Islamic group defeats public and private security efforts to destroy a country's leadership, businesses, key infrastructure and their religious opposition to create an Islamic state.

Purpose Statement

In order to conduct a multi-layered investigation on security concerns in a country that is suffering from uncontrolled terrorists attacks certain parameters had to be established. Nigeria was selected based on the following criteria:

- The country needed to have several English language news media outlets.

- The news media outlets needed to be relatively free of censorship.

- The country needed to have had a terrorism problem for at least a decade.

- A historic collection of terrorism events needed to be managed by an organization with a reliable and validity based vetting process for the terrorist attacks.

This research analyzes terrorists events included in the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database maintained by the University of Maryland. The events that summarize trends are then contrasted against the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) and the RAND National Security Research Division's Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI). Several of the terrorism events are also researched in-depth through open sourcing of local newspapers when the historic significance of an attack needed to be further analyzed. In addition the ground breaking study conducted by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point on the fighters of

Lash-k-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan will be used to compare similarities in recruiting, training with the fighters of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

There are several reasons why this type of research is important to the modern day security manager as their organizations are normally the preferred targets of terrorists. The research looks at the types of attacks that occur in Nigeria and recommends corrective actions. The thesis also examines the more noteworthy attacks to help security managers understand the scope and resources needed to perform the attack. Typically most terrorism countermeasure research is based on recently learned lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan with antidotal information from India and Beirut. Nigeria has a very well documented history of terrorism attacks and because its language is primarily English research can be more easily conducted. The Global Terrorism Database is historical in nature, but no analysis has been performed as to the frequency of terrorist attacks and what the likely form of the attacks will be. What the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) did through open sourcing of media outlets was to collect information as resources permitted on terrorist related incidents and then categorize them for statistical comparison.

Research Questions and Goals

One of the objectives of this thesis is to help security managers understand how and where terrorists attack so resources can be used effectively. The other objective of this thesis is to examine the recruitment, training and deployment cycle of Islamic terrorists. The following areas are examined to support the conclusions of this thesis:

- The history of terrorism in Nigeria.

- The different types and frequency of terrorist attacks in Nigeria.

- Comparing recruitment and training of Boko Haram members to Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba members.

- Methods security managers in Nigeria can use to better protect their organizations.

Significance of the Study

As Islamic and economic terrorism increases globally security managers must be more proactive to better mitigate potential terror attacks. This thesis examines past methods of attack and offers recommendations to mitigate and possibly prevent future attacks.   It also examines the operational similarities between Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba and Nigeria's Boko Haram as both countries have large militant Muslim populations with the common goals of a Muslim caliphate. A caliphate is an Islamic state governed by a caliph or supreme religious Muslim leader. The caliph then uses Sharia law to govern the citizens in the caliphate. In order to build a modern day caliphate all the public and private institutions of the old government have to be destroyed to support the Muslim's religious belief system.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Currently in America there are Fusion Centers which gather regionally based intelligence and disseminate the information to various government agencies. Unfortunately Nigeria, which sees daily terrorist attacks doesn't have this type of capability. For example the theft of a series of cars, which included a police car, would normally raise suspicions here in America. But in Nigeria, because of their haphazard communications and intelligence monitoring, no one recognized the criminal indicators of a pending bank robbery until after the bank robbers used the police car's siren to get away.

Currently there are a small number of open sourced terrorism databases that are available to the public and inside these databases the information can vary greatly. These organizations with

publically accessible databases used in this thesis are listed below. Each organization has its own unique set of data collection rules for gathering and analyzing information.

- Hosted by the University of Maryland, the significant events are vetted and then entered into the Global Terrorism Database funded by START. The raw information is collected through open sourcing of Nigerian and Associated Press media outlets for the purposes of cataloging the events for further analysis by government agencies and scholars.

- The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Database (IRIN), which also uses Nigerian and Associated Press media outlets and in turn uses the information to influence national policy makers.

- RAND National Security Research Division's Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI). Terrorism Incidents Database from 1972 through 2009. While their terrorism database is much smaller, they have one of the larger collections of information collected from conflict zones.

- Council on Foreign Relations, (2013). Invisible Armies Insurgency Tracker. A visual history of guerrilla warfare from 1775 to 2012. The database is designed to support the State Department's agenda toward normalizing relations with Muslim extremists.

- The Religion of Peace Database which also uses open sourcing of media outlets specifically tracks the murders and persecution of Christians by Muslims.

- Nigerian news media outlets, proved to be a fairly reliable information source as the online reports can be easily double checked for accuracy given the majority of online newspapers are in English.   While some news outlets did embellish stories or under-report stories to fit their own sales driven agenda, this was the exception and not the rule.

The primary obstacle in gathering intelligence on terrorism events in Nigeria is the overworked staffs for the different monitoring organizations. The staffs also have to cover terrorism events across the entire world so they cannot dedicate the time necessary to proper gather and analyze all the terrorism events occurring just in Nigeria. The second obstacle to data collection is incomplete data as the databases don't track unusual crimes that supports or further enables terrorism in Nigeria. The third obstacle to data collection in Nigeria is some of the regions in the country are not actively monitored by the Associated Press's network. The fourth obstacle is several regions of Nigeria have no English language news outlets, which leads to less information being collected.

Brief History of Current Nigeria

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and was granted independence by the British in 1960. After 16 years of military coups the country final moved toward a democracy in 1999 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). With most of Nigeria public infrastructure intact from when it was a British colony the country never really had a chance to develop a health public service sector. The difference between a British colony and a self-sustaining government is the British colony is focused on supporting and enriching the British government. In general public infrastructure projects that didn't add to the British coffers just didn't get approved by parliament. One of the serious problems for the Nigerian government is that "80% of the entire government revenue is spent on the administrative costs of the government at federal, state and local government levels". "Only 20 percent of the revenue is left for capital development projects" according to economist Tunde Akinrele (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Database (IRIN), 2003). This means that infrastructure building projects occur at a much slower pace if they occur at all. Lack of infrastructure inhibits economic growth

so people spend more effort and energy just working for basic needs, like food, water, shelter and medicine. In this type of economic environment the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. The overall impact to the country's burdensome government is an unhealthy economy. Nigeria's weak and dysfunctional government is ripe to be destroyed as rival groups seek to fill the vacuum left by the government. In this environment wealth redistribution is by force as criminals and terrorists take wealth, power and control from the ruling class by force.

Unfortunately the average Nigerian's life is not getting any better and even the "National Planning Commission and the United Nations Children's Fund shows that the proportion of Nigerians living in poverty increased under the civilian government" (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Database (IRIN), 2003). So in addition to fighting Muslim terrorists in the north and bandits in the river basin, the Nigerian economy is also burdened with an expensive and ineffective government.

The president is a southern Christian politician named Goodluck Johnathan, who is a very seasoned politician and highly educated man, but he is only in his first term as President. Under his leadership the Nigerian Army, Navy and police forces have begun engaging local criminal gangs and Muslim terrorists. To compound the many issues and struggles facing Nigeria is the average age of its citizens. According to the CIA 43% of the current Nigerian population is under 14 years of age and the median age for the country is 17.9 years old (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). The life expectancy for the total population is around 52 years of age. For every 1,000 Nigerians there are 0.395 doctors and .53 beds in Nigerian hospitals. The average woman has 5.31 children and the AID's infection rate in 2009 was estimated at 3.3 million Nigerians. An estimated 61.3% of the population is literate but average just nine years of school attendance (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).

Terrorism before Boko Haram

The Global Terrorism Database began tracking terrorism events in Nigeria on January 17, 1980 and the first terrorist attack was in Kaduna, Nigeria and was committed by the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. The terrorists attacked a diplomatic official connected to the government, but with no known casualties. After that the next four assassinations were government officials and the last assassination for this particular time frame was at a school in Lagos where three people were killed (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2012). From 1991 to 2009 there have been many different types of targets with a mix of terrorists and criminal groups committing the attacks. In the beginning many of the attacks were centered on the rich oil producing areas of Nigeria. MEND in the Niger Delta area was the most violent during the early days of the historical information.

Terrorism after Boko Haram

On July 27, 2009 Boko Haram received their first credit for a terrorist attack when they simultaneously attacked Maiduguri and Gambaru in Nigeria. The armed assault left "50 civilians, 22 suspected militants, two police officers, one soldier and one prison officer dead" in the city of Maiduguri alone (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2012). Since then Boko Haram has committed 305 out of 578 attacks ending on December 2011. Of the remaining 284 attacks, no group claimed credit or could be definitively linked to the attacks. Since their beginnings Boko Haram's attacks have increased in destructiveness, loss of life and in frequency. The organization's leadership has learned from their past mistakes and has learned how to coordinate multiple attacks, which has become a trademark for their organization. When Boko Haram attacks a city, it tends to attack in several locations at once. Their carefully planned multiple attacks overwhelm the government's

command and control network, which helps spread confusion, aids in their escape and causes

more panic than a single attack alone would produce.

Brief Overview of the Origins of Boko Haram

Boko Haram's founder Mohammad Yusuf, "who founded the group in 2002, was executed

while in police custody in 2009" (Nweke, 2011). Prior to that Yusuf's father was said to have

founded the organization in the 1960's (Nweke, 2011) Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar bin

Mohammad Shekau, now leads the organization" (Baldauf, 2012). Mohammad Yusuf began by

"preaching and preparing for jihad, but he [Shekau] transformed it from a preaching group about

jihad to an actual jihadist group," according to Jacob Zen, the Nigeria analyst for the

Washington-based Jamestown Foundation (Look, (2013). Yusuf was videoed during a "field

interrogation" inside of a police headquarters with the video posted to Youtube via Sahara TV

(Saharatv, 2009). Shortly afterwards he was executed outside of the same police headquarters.

So the Army and the government never had a chance to fully exploit his knowledge of the

organization that he and his father had built.

Originally the Boko Haram wanted to be known as the Nigerian Taliban, but changed their

name after the Taliban were driven out of Afghanistan by U.S. led forces after 9/11. Boko

Haram's original base camp was even nick-named "Afghanistan" (Nweke, 2011). The group

then selected the name Boko Haram which loosely translates to "Western Education Forbidden".

Strategically and tactically this approach lets Boko Haram pick and choose their targets. So one

target may be a town's communications antenna and the next target could be rounding up

student's at a Muslim college of Agriculture and executing them (Jha, 2013). "Boko Haram's

strategy of forbidding western education enables the organization to pick and choose which

targets and technologies they can use to further their own agenda, hence motorcycles and cars can also be used" (Nweke, 2011).

Current Command Structure of Boko Haram

In addition to Shekau a growing group Muslim clerics and politicians are expanding their Muslim's bases of influence as well. Military forces have twice claimed to have killed Shekau and both times Shekau survived the attacks. After he survived the attacks he released videos to rally his followers and assert his leadership over them. However, the last attack left him visible injured in his video, but still alive and appearing to be in command of Boko Haram, which was most likely the intent of the video.

Because Boko Haram is dispersed across northern Nigeria their command structure is fractured. Each region has through the habits and traditions of past sub-leaders have developed their own methodologies and targets to attack. Historically a particular region will suffer from a certain type of attack, which makes the organization predictable and less effective. Years ago in American this phenomenon was analyzed and the United States developed a methodology to prevent this "one mindedness" called the Delphi Procedure. With the Delphi Procedure, the members of a target assessment team anonymously pick targets to exploit or attack; the organizational leader's personality which normally dominates all aspects of targeting is taken out of the process (Garbo, 2002, p. 153). The Delphi Procedure is very applicable in stopping terrorists as it weighs operational objectives in terms of fair and balanced analysis versus a leadership driven "ego" based analysis. This is how changing leaders to get better results really works. In that while the new leader works to fill the leadership vacuum left by the old leader, the voices of reason are more readily listened to. By using the Delphi Procedure organizational goals are attained quicker with a minimum of wasted effort and resources.

There is also another social theory at work with terrorists, which is a derivative of Edwin Sutherland's 1939 differential association theory (Sutherland, 1939). The young people are recruited into Boko Haram and LeT at an early age and even "groomed" to put the differential association theory into modern terms. Children learn how to become child soldiers or terrorists so that killings and bombings become socially acceptable to them as a normal way of life. Then the new recruits in turn pass on these same learned behaviors to the next generation of recruits. With the average Nigerian at 17 years old right now, this behavior could influence the region's stability for generations to come.

Just as people are creatures of habit so is an organization and this includes criminal gangs and terrorist organizations too. The longer a terrorist organization operates under the same leadership, the more an organizational "profile" can be developed. Just as organizations learn by success and failure so do criminal and terrorist organizations. By examining terrorists past targets and by listening to their current threats security managers can get clues as to the terrorist's current and future targets. Normally the type of attack will stay the same until the terrorists suffer a serious setback. At which time the "blowback" for the terrorist's failure is either placed on the terrorists carrying out the failed mission or on the leader that sent them on the failed mission.

The Statistical Relationship of Boko Haram to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

Lashkar-e-Taiba, "a government of Pakistan enterprise" (Swami, 2013) since its inception has been hostile to Hindus in India. "Backed and funded by the Pakistani government, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is now the largest jihadist group in South Asia with offices next to several Pakistani military bases" (Swami, 2013). Clearly LeT is one of the best examples of state sponsored terrorism. The statistical relationship to Nigeria's Boko Haram is that many civic leaders in the

northern states of Nigeria are supporting Boko Haram in many of the same ways that the

Pakistani government is supporting LeT.

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point analyzed 900 biographies from deceased LeT

fighters and studied them from recruitment to death by analyzing LeT websites and publications.

Their study was highly comprehensive and very revealing on how a state sponsored terrorist

group is able to recruit, train and deploy their fighters. The study also provided insight in the

poverty cycle that has to be maintained in order for their socio-economic environment to remain

favorable for the long term goal of a Muslim caliphate state.

The first concept that any group has to master when recruiting for a para-military organization

is that the 17-21 year old group is the easiest to recruit from. The recruits are looking to belong

to something important and will join an organization that promises them social stature. In

Nigeria 43% of the total population is less than 14 years of age (Central Intelligence Agency,

2013), so there will be an abundance of child soldiers for the foreseeable future in the 17-21 year

old age bracket.

The most influential aspect of getting a recruit to join LeT is the family pressure placed on the

potential recruit.   Normally the recruit's fathers and brothers talk the recruit into joining LeT for

social status and religious reasons (Fair, Ghosh, Jamal, Rassler & Shoeb, 2013). Sharing first

place in recruiting is actual recruitment efforts by current LeT members which the Pakistani

government sanctions.   Just as the family is normally seen as the driving force hoping to benefit

from their successful children, the family is also seen as the driving force behind those families

hoping to benefit from waging war on the infidels. This is the economic concept behind income

redistribution through armed conflict. In Nigeria the average age in the country is currently 17

years old (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) and this means fewer parents are living long

enough to raise their children. So while fathers and brothers would normally influence young males to join a Muslim group it is a slightly different case for Nigerian males. Aids and poor health care has decimated many parents, leaving their surviving children now orphaned. Economic conditions are only getting worse in Nigeria, especially in the northern states currently under military law. In Nigeria's economic climate of utter poverty recruiting orphaned children for an extremist organization is very easy and normally begins with an offering of food.

LeT in Pakistan actually has a 21 day basic training camp for young fighters to attend and be trained and they "learn parts of the Qur'an and how to perform Islamic rituals in the Ahl-e-Hadith way" and they receive training in the use of the Kalashnikov rifle (AK-47), grenades and basic small unit or guerilla tactics (Fair, Ghosh, Jamal, Rassler & Shoeb, 2013, p.4). After basic training the new recruits go on to advanced training where they learn small arms tactics like how to perform an ambush and other survival technics and this training lasts about three months. Typically LeT indoctrinates young men into their organization and teaches them how to follow orders and helps them to become an effective shooter during an attack.

Of the 900 LeT fighters studied "the mean age at the time of their death was 21 years of age" (Fair, Ghosh, Jamal, Rassler & Shoeb, 2013, p.14) with the mean length of time in the LeT organization at about 5.14 years so most of the LeT fighters killed were in the junior ranks of the LeT organization. So while the young LeT fighter's death created another slot for a recruiter to fill, their death did not cause the LeT organization any true hardship, as say a drone strike on a command and control center would. While LeT has suffered some leadership casualties in past fighting with India, that is the exception and not the norm.

III. METHODOLOGY

Data Collection Techniques

The original Global Terrorism Database was designed by breaking down the relevant

information about a terrorist attack into manageable data fields by the original investigators at

Pinkerton Global Security for further analysis. Their original goal was to capture information

about the type of attack, weapons used, date, time and location so that researchers could have a

means of analyzing the data.

FIELD NAME	FIELD DESCRIPTION
GTD ID	17 January 1980 To 27 December 2011
DATE	Date of Event
COUNTRY	Country where Attack Happened
CITY	City where Attack Happened
PERPETRATOR 1	Organization that Attacked or Suspected Organization
INCIDENT SUMMARY	Brief Description of Attack
GUNCERTAIN 1	0 for no Gun, 1 for Gun
GUNCERTAIN 2	This field was left blank by Original Investigators
PERPETRATOR 3	This field was left blank by Original Investigators
FATALITIES	People Killed in the Attack
INJURED	People Wounded or Injured in the Attack
TARGET TYPE 1	Target Types were given Labels like Government, Business
TARGET TYPE 2	Target Types were given Labels like Government, Business
TARGET TYPE 3	Target Types were given Labels like Government, Business
ATTACK TYPE 1	Attack Types were given Labels like Assassination, Bombings
ATTACK TYPE 2	Attack Types were given Labels like Assassination, Bombings
WEAPON TYPE 1	Weapon Types were given Labels like Firearms, Incendiary

Table 1 Global Terrorism Database Fields. Copyright 2013 by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

The Global Terrorism Database which consisted of 577 individual event summaries for

Nigeria contains records dating from 1980 to December 2011, which were downloaded into

Microsoft's Excel for further analysis. The data fields were then sorted by terrorist events,

which included information on the target type, city in Nigeria, attack type, attacker's weapons,

perpetrator (known and unknown) and date of the attack. Additional fields that were normally

blank or "null" were deleted to better sort through the existing information.

FIELD NAME	FIELD DESCRIPTION
DATE	Date of Attack
COUNTRY	Country where the Attack Happened
CITY	City where the Attack Happened
PERPETRATOR 1	Organization that Attacked or the Suspected Organization
INCIDENT SUMMARY	Brief Description of the Attack
FATALITIES	People Killed in the Attack
INJURED	People Wounded or Injured in the Attack
TARGET TYPE 1	Target Types were given Labels like Government or Business
ATTACK TYPE 1	Attack Types were given Labels like Assassination or Bombings
WEAPON TYPE 1	Weapon Types were given Labels like Firearms or Incendiary

Table 2 Global Terrorism Database Fields used for the purposes of analyzing terrorists attacks.

The original analysis was based on frequency of events to examine particular patterns for the

different terrorists groups inside of Nigeria. Besides Boko Haram, there are also several other

militia groups or terrorists, which include the Bush Boys, Tom's Militia and the Movement for

the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). MEND is often responsible for attacks on

shipping and oil rigs in the Niger Delta area.

Statistical Analysis

Data Flow for Analyzing Events through Multiple Databases

Global Terrorism Database

IRIN Database

RAND Corporation Database

Religion of Peace Database

Nigerian Open Sourcing (Broadcast Media Outlets and Online Newspapers)

To Analysis and Conclusion in Thesis

Figure 1 Process of dataflow for analysis.

A methodology had to be worked out so that single events could be studied across all of the databases for comparison. When data was analyzed the question or query flowed through the databases in the following manner and the Religion of Peace Database and Nigerian Open Sources were only used to supplement information already contained or left out of the other databases.

After the frequency of the types of terrorist attacks was analyzed, the incident summaries were further researched through the other databases and then through open sourcing of local media accounts to discover what really happened on the ground. It was then discovered that many more terrorist events could have been recorded into the various databases, but wasn't. Many massacres of people and especially Nigerian Christians, which also met the guidelines for inclusion into any of the examined databases, were simply not included. For the most part the local newspapers did an excellent job in reporting news of the many terrorist attacks.

While data integrity was maintained to support validity and reliability for further research, the data was analyzed differently to support the security management aspects of this thesis. For example in the assassination section, the incident summaries were analyzed to discover where the victim was assassinated so that security managers could develop better techniques for protecting people. In analyzing the Global Terrorism Database 32 separate spreadsheets were constructed to facilitate the analysis of the data with another three complete databases being built to support referencing from the Religion of Peace's yearly datasets which contained 1032 separate terrorist incidents. It should be noted that the databases actually only overlap for about five years.

Instead of designing an experiment to code and track terrorist incidents in Nigeria this thesis seeks to analyze data already gathered and sorted into fields by several organizations. Then by

using their combined data to make deductions as to how security managers can best protect

property, lives and their organization's reputation.

Figure 2 Terrorism Events in Nigeria by Year from the Global Terrorism Database

IV. RESULTS

Income Producing Crimes – Kidnappings and Robberies

Kidnappings and robberies can be used as income producing crimes for terrorists just as it is

for criminals and criminal gangs. The difference between a criminal for "profit kidnapping" and

a political kidnapping is a political kidnapping is designed to "create sensationalism, be visible

or make a statement", "the percentage of hostages that are killed [in kidnappings] can be quite

high" according to Scott Harrell, founder of CompassPoint Investigations (Harrell, 2011). So

from a security manager's point of view in addition to the human toll of a kidnapping there is

also the loss of income, concessions to kidnappers and loss of the company's reputation. The

damage done internally and externally by the kidnapping can be immense to an organization. On

the other hand the political kidnappers gain the publicity of being "above the law" and a quick

payday for very little work and with practically no risk to the organization's leadership. The

following is analysis of all the incident summaries in the Global Terrorism Database with those

that produced income from the actual event being classified as either for extortion, kidnapping

and robbery.

Income Producing Crimes

Robbery 7 Events
5%

Extortion 8 Events
6%

Kidnapping
125 Events
89%

Figure 3 Income Producing Crimes from the Global Terrorism Database.

The kidnapping victims were either a large group of workers from an oil platform or specific

single targets like a politician or member of the politician's family. The vast majority of kidnap

victims were taken from their work site, while 17% were taken from their home or place of

lodging. With several entries in the Global Terrorism Database reporting vehicle abductions and

these amounted to 9% of the total kidnappings.

Figure 4 Location Victim/s When Kidnapped from the Global Terrorism Database.

The difficult part of protecting someone in their home in Nigeria is sometimes the attacking force can number up to 30 gunmen. When 30 gunmen attack a home the gunmen quickly overwhelm any security force, especially if any members of the security force are working in conjunction with the attackers. The logical assumption would be since you can't hold off the attacking force and you can't escape with the "principal" and their family, then having a safe room would be the next best alternative.

Just as it takes money to make more money, it takes crime to commit terrorism and it takes a great deal of crime to support the level of terrorism activities employed by Boko Haram. A bank robbery can be a predecessor to a larger scale attack, such as the bank robbery in Lagos, Nigeria where $320,000 was stolen. The attackers used several stolen vehicles with one of them being a police car with siren which aided in their escape (BBC World Service, 2001). This took a higher level of planning than a normal Nigerian style bank robbery. Then the next month in Lagos 50 members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) attacked the Owutu police station and stole a

large amount of arms and ammunition. While the two events have never been linked together

publically, it is odd that the bank robbery and the assault and capture of a police station occurred

in the same region and less than 30 days from each other. Think of any type of crime as a series

of learning experiences for the criminals, so as the criminals gain more experience the crimes

become more complex and the "pay day" for the criminal's increases.

One of the metrics that needs governmental attention in Nigeria is income producing crimes.

Large scale attacks require many resources in order to be launched successfully. However even

if a terrorist operation struggles at the beginning of an attack, any degree of success means the

operation was at least partly successful. In the early days of the United States monitoring

terrorism events in Nigeria the average attack consisted of a group of "youths" getting together

and kidnapping westerners from the rich oil producing areas of Nigeria. However this is

misleading as in Nigeria "the word "youth" is used to describe all young men who have not

reached the status of "elder" in their communities" (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Crimes of this

nature take a great deal of leadership and planning because of the complexities of the crimes.

When a group of "youths" simultaneously have "stormed two oil drilling rigs and took 165

Shell Oil employees hostage" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to

Terrorism (START), 2012) this hints at an experienced command and control network. In

breaking down this hostage taking operation into observable metrics, there would have been

several large groups of males gathering with weapons and supplies around the local seaside

communities. Boats and vehicles would have been fueling up prior to the attack. Weapons

training and possible test firings would have been conducted. There would have been increased

radio, telephone and cyber chatter before, during and after the attack. Pre-positioned support

people on the shore would have been waiting to help the kidnappers get away. This is an

excellent example of how community policing could work by training willing and alert citizens to be cognizant of suspicious activities and people. By focusing community policing efforts around high value areas local law enforcement and private security managers could have been more successfully in stopping the attacks. Local law enforcement and private security managers just need to develop a discreet reporting system so the citizens wouldn't be identified.

An interesting concept about community policing is that any security manager can develop a network of community observers or a "mini-intelligence network". Just by offering to share intelligence with other companies often produces a security "dividend". Offering cash rewards for citizen tips ensures safety for the entire community, with these tips being forwarded to local law enforcement and other companies as well. Security managers are only limited by their imagination and audacity in keeping their organizations safe.

There is another concept that needs to be examined in the attacks and that is information leakage. Normally using an information security risk assessments (ISRA) concept or asset focused method of information security an organization can identify critical information and develop ways to protect it. Traditionally these methods focused mostly on trade secrets, salaries, contracts and accounting systems. In a conflict zone the "leakage wake" (think of the wake a boat leaves on a lake) and the "leakage wake" gets rather large rather quickly. Company schedules are a gold mine of information to competitors and terrorists alike. Simple things like field maintenance operations can yield terrorists a quick group of unarmed hostages. Security patrol schedules can lead to unsecured areas being exploited. Key employees can be targeted for assassination or kidnapping. A high level computer technician's knowledge of the enterprise information system could lead to devastating security breaches for a company. A dedicated exploitation team could compromise an enterprise wide system in a couple of hours just by

torturing a kidnapped "computer geek" for information. Suddenly a security manager has the

suspicious death of a "computer geek" to investigate and a series of random computer security

events as the exploitation team establishes control over the company's computer systems.

Strangers Being Milling Around Key Infrastructure

Increased Cyber/Telephone Chatter

Weapons Firing in Distance

Vehicles Being Stolen

New Faces in Town   Terrorists Preparing To Attack

Crime Rate Goes Up

Large Group of Unknown Men

New Vehicles in Town

Rape Committed by Strangers Increases

Loss of Communications with outlying Facilities

Information Wake for a Simple Attack

Figure 5 Information Wake for a Simple Attack.

Suddenly hacked passwords would be the least of a security manager's concerns. Backdoors

could be built to bypass existing and future security and in essence the company's own enterprise

system would become an intelligence collection asset to terrorists and competitors alike.

When developing a new product there are four highly exploitable phases the concept goes

through as it is developed. "Socialisation, externalization, combination and internalization"

(Ahmad, Scheepers, Shedden & Smith, 2011) these processes create email traffic, telephone

conversations and endless meetings. So laser listening devices and enterprise level hacking can

easily decipher what a company is working towards in a matter of days. The interesting part of

this concept of developing and sharing tacit knowledge is a terrorist's operational process goes

through the same exploitable process, which is why monitoring terrorist's "chatter" becomes so

important.

Analyzing Armed Assaults

Armed assaults are the easiest type of attack to perform and can range from a lone gunman to

several hundred armed attackers. In Nigeria 207 armed assaults occurred out of the 577

terrorism events in the Global Terrorism Database. Of the 207 armed assaults 64 targeting

private citizens. The armed assaults included attacks on police stations, private homes and

vehicle attacks. Attacks ranged from a group of people shooting from a moving motorcycle to

dismounted infantry styles of attacks. One of the attacks in 1999 targeted over 200 nursing

mothers and their babies (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to

Terrorism (START), 2012). Normally Nigeria's armed attackers carry variants of the AK-47

rifle, but armed attackers in the Global Terrorism Database can also mean the attackers were just

using machetes.

An example of how two simple attacks were carried out on the evening of October 6, 2010 in

Maiduguri, Nigeria, where "militants riding motorcycles fired upon the house of Ali Modu, the

speaker of the Borno State House of Assembly, killing one policeman". At the same time

another group of "militants riding motorcycles entered the house" of the national vice chairman

of the All Nigeria Peoples Party and killed him" (National Consortium for the Study of

Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2012). While these are easy attacks to prepare

for, they still involved surveillance of the targets, resourcing for motorcycles and weapons,

recruiting the gunmen and training for the gunmen. The training could have been as simple as

teaching the gunmen how to pin down and push passed any security officers that would be protecting the intended victims.

Basically there are two types of attacks; the hasty attack and the deliberate attack. "The primary difference between the two types of attacks is the extent of planning and preparation conducted by the attacking force." (Department of the Army, 2008) Typically the larger or more complex the attack the more prior coordination, resourcing and logistics are needed to successfully accomplish the attack. So attacking a well-guarded target requires more organizational resources which widen the operation's "intelligence wake". So if metric collection processes are in place then the ripples generated by the terrorist's intelligence collection operations are sensed and disseminated to the appropriate parties. It should come as no surprise that terrorists like soft targets just like criminals do. Soft targets don't have the means or resources to repel an attack, so they pose little risk to the terrorists. Most private citizens are vulnerable to terrorist's attacks as most private citizens don't have the resources or experience to defend against a highly motivated group.

Terrorist's attacks against police officers are particularly troubling and cause for alarm as the police are supposed to protect the citizenry and not become targets themselves. The analysis of the attacks on police is interesting in that twelve attacks could also have been coded as assassinations in the Global Terrorism Database.

What was the Failure Point that allowed the Armed Assaults to be Successful?

The armed assaults ranged from walking up and shooting into a group of people to attackers dressing up in military uniforms with bullet proof vests and executing highly complex attacks. The largest factor in the armed assaults is attacking a soft or unprotected target.

Targets of Armed Assaults

Educational Institutions 1%

Journalists and Media 2%

Non-Governmental Organizations 2%

Other 3%

Maritime 4%

Utilities (Mostly Pipelines) 6%

Private Citizens 35%

Military 8%

Religious Groups/Locations 8%

Government Facilities 14%

Businesses 0%

Police 17%

**Figure 6 Targets of Armed Assaults from the Global Terrorism Database.**

Also included in the armed assaults were several incidents of attackers armed with machetes attacking civilians in villages and in churches. Here again community policing would be an invaluable tool to local law enforcement and security managers as citizens would have noticed a group of men getting together and moving toward their objective.

Figure 7 Attacks on Police Officers by Armed Assaults from the Global Terrorism Database.

Analyzing Assassinations

In Nigeria while murders are common place, assassinations were only recorded in only 34 of the 577 Nigerian entries in the Global Terrorism Database. To be labeled as an assassination a person had to have a fair amount of social, business or political standing and been the main target of the attack. The assassination victims ranged from military officers, government officials and local tribal chiefs and businessmen. Firearms were used in 25 of the assassinations and the most common location of the assassination being the home of the victim. Next were assassination of the victim in their car and then in a public place or at work. Nine of the documented assassinations did not have a location recorded in the Global Terrorism Database. Several victims had police officers providing security for them with the police officers also being wounded or killed in the assassinations. Three more assassination attempts were carried out with explosives which resulted in several people being injured. Finally two assassinations were carried out by stabbing the victim to death.

There was no mention of professionally trained executive protection specialist or a team of specialists being present at any of the assassinations. So it can only be theorized that with the proper resources the intended target and their family could have survived an assassination attempt. Whether through escaping the area or hiding out in a safe room the target most likely would have been safe as the assassinations appeared to be a "low level" type of attack. The Global Terrorism Database recorded one "high level" crime where a single person was kidnapped by the kidnappers "bypassing" a home alarm system.

One of the interesting aspects of an assassination, especially of a journalist is the media backlash. The old rule that you never go to war with someone that "buys ink by the barrel" still applies today with media outlets. While the assassination of a journalist will guarantee media exposure, the media backlash will begin soon after the shock has worn off.

In Burkina Faso, a small African nation near Nigeria, a prominent journalist named Norbert Zongo was assassinated by the Burkina Faso government. "Zongo's assassination provided the trigger for an impending social explosion" (Harsch, 1999) as the country exploded in marches and riots. Groups organized and began protesting the government on campuses and in town squares. Politically speaking it was a disaster for the Burkina Faso government and the country's court system slowly turned on the ruling government as well. The interesting point in the Burkina Faso student riots is that graduate students, who led the riots, had studied in Cuba. Home of Fidel Castro, whose mentor was General Alberto Bayo (Bayo, 1963, p.ii), known for his Marxist guerilla techniques used in inciting riots and overthrowing governments. Analysis of assassinations in Nigeria reveals that all levels of government workers were the preferred targets by terrorists.

Location of Assassination

At Home
40%

Unknown
36%

In Vehicle
16%

In Public Place
4%

In Work Place
4%

Figure 8 Location of Assassination from the Global Terrorism Database.

Assassination Victims

Government
61%

Military
6%

Non-Governmental Organizations
6%

Private Citizens
6%

Political Party
6%

Businesses
3%

Educational Institutions
3%

Journalists and Media
3%

Other
3%

Police
3%

Figure 9 Assassination Victims from the Global Terrorism Database.

What was the Failure Point that allowed the Assassinations to be Successful?

Most of the assassinations occurred in the evening time between seven and midnight in the

home of the victim. In many cases there were simply more gunmen than police or security

officers and they were overwhelmed by a superior force. In the executive protection realm of personal security, the person being protected is known as the "principal" and the principal lives and operates inside of a protective "bubble" or a moving variation of the concentric ring theory. Concentric ring theory is basically a circle or terrain based perimeter which layers security so that as each level of security is approached it is harder to pass through that layer to get to the principal or "most protected asset". For example the first layer of security is a wall around the principal's home, the next layer is the principal's house and the final layer is the six foot bubble (zone) around the actual principal.   Concentric ring theory would have bought the principals more time to escape or given local law enforcement more time to respond. When concentric rings are used in conjunction with a safe room, the protective measures would have given the principals and their families more time and the ability to survive the attack. Robert Oatman's "A System of Security", goes into great detail on securing the six aspects of a "principal's" life which are transportation, domestic and international travel, home and office security and technology and intelligence (Oatman, 2006), which are also "the six weakest areas in most security plans as well", according to Oatman. The assassinations and kidnappings listed in the Global Terrorism Database follow's Oatman's theory as evidenced by the locations of assassinations and kidnappings. The home is still the most vulnerable place for victims, so ample and overlapping precautions must be taken there. In the world of executive protection, when a protected person is injured or killed it destroys the credibility of the security manager and their protection force.

Analyzing Bombings

Bombings accounted for 176 of the 577 terrorists events in Nigeria. The first bombing was on March 13, 1992 at a religious institution in Jalingo, Nigeria which killed 20 people. The last

bombings recorded were the multiple 2011 Christmas Day bombings in northern Nigeria. The Global Terrorism Database records 605 people were killed and 762 were injured in the 176 bombings. The Religion of Peace, a group that monitors the news media and other open sources of information for jihadists attacks reports the number of victims of bombings in Nigeria as 1,278 for the same time period (The Religion of Peace, 2013). This number was calculated by combining all of the Religion of Peace Databases together to build a single searchable database that sorted the attacks by bombings.

In the Global Terrorism Database a bombing event could actually contain several bombings with multiple targets. For some reason all the bombings for a particular day and region could be lumped together into a single incident summary. Statistically the bombings in Nigeria tended to be a single bomb planted and detonated, with some multiple bombings occurring at the same time. The concept behind multiple bombings was to overwhelm responding forces and slow down any rescue efforts. When two bombs were used at the same location the intent was to kill first responders with a second more powerful blast after they arrived on scene. Multiple location bombings also aid in the bomber's escape and demonstrate the terrorist's ability to kill and create fear in the civilian population.

In one of the events Boko Haram "bombed a police station, a bank and a beer parlour" (Moses, 2011) with the resulting fire from the beer parlor bombing burning down several adjoining businesses. It is most likely that the primary focus of the bombings was to steal money from the bank as the attackers entered the bank's vault and stole money. The attack on the police station was most likely to limit the police force's response to the bank robbery. The attack on the beer parlor was to create causalities and chaos and was a diversionary tactic for the bank robbery.

Figure 10 How Bombs were used from the Global Terrorism Database.

Of the 176 bombings in Nigeria 32 targeted government buildings and 31 targeted businesses which included bars, beer gardens and taverns. 24 bombings were against oil pipelines or power plants and were coded as "utilities" in the Global Terrorism Database. 23 bombings were against churches and religious targets, but in only six times were the churches bombed during a Sunday service. This is in dispute with the Religion of Peace's database which recorded 15 bombings on Sunday which targeting churches with an estimated 195 killed and 596 wounded and injured.

The days of the weeks for bombings to occur in frequency were 46 on Fridays with most bombings targeting groups of people in businesses, taverns or bars. Sundays had the second highest frequency at 39 bombings, but the Global Terrorism Database only recorded six churches as being the bombed during services.

**Figure 1 Sunday Church Bombing Methods According to the Religion of Peace Database.**

Figure 12 Bombings by Days of the Week from the Global Terrorism Database.

Figure 13 Bombing Targets from the Global Terrorism Database.

The difference between a simple attack and a complex attack is the amount of planning, resources and coordination required to execute the attack. An example of a simple attack is when a lone bomber walks into a building and detonates their bomb. However, when multiple bombers attack several locations at once, then it's most likely a well-planned complex bombing. In this example the lone bomber needed few resources and little planning, while in the complex bombing, the terrorists spent days if not weeks in preparation. So it stands to reason that the more complex the attack, the larger the "information wake" generated by the attackers, which translates into more observable metrics being broadcast throughout the targeted area.

What was the Failure Point that allowed the Bombers to be Successful?

The problem with bombs is a small explosive placed in the right location and time can cause extreme destruction. The best practice for keeping out bombs is to keep the bombers out of the

area through enhanced security. The best practice is to utilize a concentric security ring approach around areas that are considered to be a high value target or easy target of opportunity. The goal of any concentric ring of security is to minimize the size of the explosive that can enter that particular area. For example a caterer's truck would not be allowed inside of a compound, while chefs with cooking equipment would not be allowed in the main building. The goal for security is to minimize the size of the threat and to encourage any potential terrorists to look for an easier target.

Most of the bombs appeared to be planted at night either deliberately as in the case of an oil and gas pipeline bombings or hastily placed like in a church or crowded bar. Just searching people prior to them entering a facility sends out a strong message that there is security in place. Usually attackers seek out a softer target where they will have a better chance of success.

Analyzing Suicide Bombers

The majority of bombers in Nigeria planted their bombs and escaped or at least attempted to safely escape, however, a small minority of suicide bombers did strike targets in Nigeria according to the Global Terrorism Database. The information from these suicide bomber attacks is presented as follows:

Three suicide bombers from Boko Haram, in a black SUV after failing to gain entry into a military installation blew up their SUV outside of the installation. In this case the security forces prevented the vehicle from gaining access to the installation where casualties would have been higher, fortunately only the suicide bombers were killed. This also points out a flaw in Boko Haram leadership as they didn't give their suicide bombers a secondary target or contingency plan.

In another case Boko Haram tried to destroy a police station in Maiduguri, but the police fired on the vehicle and killed the driver before he could detonate his car bomb. Again the security plan worked and no one but the suicide bomber was killed. The forensics gathered from an unexploded car bomb is vast with DNA, fingerprints and intact bomb components that can lead to terrorist cells being captured. The components and explosives analysis alone can lead to sympathetic suppliers as building a car bomb is a major undertaking. Some police stations in Nigeria now have entry points that allow for the screening of vehicles seeking access into the station and in this case everything worked as it was designed to. The police officers were able to recognize the threat and neutralize the driver before the suicide bomber had a chance to blow up his vehicle. Time wise the actions of the police officers occurred in mere seconds as the suicide bomber most likely had only to flip a switch to detonate the car bomb. These split second and life- saving actions speak highly of the police officers motivation and training.

A lone suicide bomber blew up their vehicle at the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja killing 23 people and injuring 81 people. In this case the vehicle according to Farhan Haq, a United Nations deputy spokesman said that the suicide bomber "drove through two gates that surrounded the building". "The vehicle then headed toward the reception area and explode[d]" according to Adebayo Jelil, a security guard at the building (Murray and Nossiter, 2011). The first three floors of the building were destroyed by the bomb blast. In this case anti-vehicle barriers would have limited the destruction by creating more standoff distance between the suicide car bomb and the United Nations Building. Another design feature could have been taller concrete walls on the bottom two floors of the building. As it was the ground floor's walls were made up of glass which shattered and injured even more people than just the bomb's blast would have. The use of raised concrete planters that also serve as anti-vehicle barriers which

absorb the energy of the blast would have greatly reduced the casualties and damage done to the

building.

Figure 2 United Nations photograph of the car bomb.   Notice how the block counter wall remained in place? While the people in the room were killed by the concussion and explosion, this is an excellent example of how reinforced concrete can stop a car bomb.

   Boko Haram had a suicide car bomber drive into a convoy leaving the State Security Service

Building, this attack was part of a string of attacks on one Christmas Day. In this instance the

State Security Service failed to increase their own operational security while responding to a

series of bombings as they missed the surveillance team watching the very agency charged with

keeping the country safe from terrorists.

Attacks by City

   Four cities in Nigeria stood out above the rest in violent attacks listed in the Global Terrorism

Database, where violent attacks happen almost weekly as the gangs and militias fight for control.

Maiduguri, Nigeria suffered 97 attacks or terrorist events from July 2009 to December 2011.

Most Attacked Cities In Nigeria

Jos 27
13%

Lagos 33
16%

Maiduguri 97
46%

Port Harcourt 54
25%

Figure 15 Most Attacked Cities in Nigeria from the Global Terrorism Database.

On 27 July 2009 Boko Haram coordinated seven attacks on the city when they attacked and

destroyed police stations, churches and a primary school and set fire and damaged at least ten

residences. At least 50 people were killed along with 22 of the attacking militants (National

Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2012) during the

attacks.

Armed assaults were used in 63 of the recorded events that occurred in Maiduguri with

targets ranging from police to religious institutions. The targets all held positions in society from

the spokesman for the tricycle taxi operators to a protocol officer with the government and also

included military and police officers. Most of the attackers were on motorcycles which along

with being easy to obtain also aided in their getaway. Bombings occurred in 25 of the terrorist's

events. One of the more tragic bombings was a bomb placed outside the El-Kanemi Theological

College which targeted parents, children and Muslim worshippers. The parents were picking up their children from religious school as others were entering the mosque for their daily noon prayers (New York Post, 2011) when the bomb went off. The oddest attack involved Boko Haram warning shop keepers to close up their shops and then several hours later they attacked the Nigeria Joint Task Force in golf carts while singing war songs. This attack lasted for several hours with three members of the Joint Task Force being killed. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2012).

Port Harcourt is the hub for nearly all of the oil producing foreign companies in Nigeria and it is also one of the wealthiest cities in Nigeria. The first entries for the city of Port Harcourt in the Global Terrorism Database were on February 2, 2007 when a Pilipino woman and a French oil worker were kidnapped and two navy sailors were murdered (most likely resisting the kidnappers). Of the 54 recorded events in Port Harcourt nine were against pipeline and oil companies (coded as utilities in the Global Terrorism Database) and ranged from kidnapping utilities workers, bombing oil production facilities to armed assaults against oil producing companies. 15 of the recorded events were against private citizens mostly in the form of kidnappings. There was one well planned attack on the water front neighborhood of Amadi-Ama in Port Harcourt. The well-coordinated attack began in the evening when approximately 50 black uniformed militia members from "Tom's NDV" landed in speedboats and attacked the "Bush Boy's" militia controlled area in Amadi-Ama. The attack began in the evening and lasted until 6:00 a.m. and seven houses were destroyed with dynamite (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Database (IRIN), 2003).

On 18 December, 2006 two car bombs went off at the residential compounds of two foreign oil companies, one in the parking lot inside the compound and one along a compound's

perimeter wall. Both of these attacks could have been a prelude to a secondary follow on attack, but they were not. Then five days later another car bomb exploded outside the office of the Governor, but again with no casualties.

Oil theft from the oil companies fuels many different levels of criminal activity and corruption in Port Harcourt. So while the government is trying to step up policing efforts to reduce the threats to the oil companies the government's own waste and corruption are hindering any positive progress. In Nigeria oil thefts or bunkering as it's called in Nigeria accounts for 10% of Nigeria's daily oil production being lost (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p.7). The money gained by the thefts of oil goes toward the purchase of firearms and supplies for the different militias.

Lagos had 33 terrorists' attacks with ten of them being bombings and with nine assassinations. Unfortunately there were no entries in the incident summaries for the Lagos events in the Global Terrorism Database; however the RAND Corporation Nigerian Terrorism Database recorded six events in their database (RAND National Security Research Division's Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), 2013). The terrorism events included Saudi Arabian diplomats being ambushed, several mass kidnappings of 40 to 60 oil workers and an attempt on the Lago's Governor's life. In addition there were several spectacular events like a large intentional oil spill and the state-run petroleum corporation offices being set on fire (RAND National Security Research Division's Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), 2013. The Human Rights Watch in an attempt to help lessen the violence wrote a position paper which called for more transparency of oil revenues while trying to integrate more locals into the oil companies operations (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The problem is that neither side has

anything to gain by stopping how they do business. As the oil companies want to keep their profits and the terrorists want to take those profits.

Jos rounded out the top cities for attacks by terrorists with 27 terrorist's attacks. The majority of attacks in Jos were bombings which targeted churches, mosques, shopping markets and even soccer games. There were ten armed assaults in Jos with victims ranging from political leaders to entire churches and villages with the attackers using rifles and machetes to kill and wound their victims. Fires of churches, businesses and villages were also counted inside of the armed assault dataset.

Failure Points in the Cities

In reviewing the cities and the terrorist's methodologies for attacks, it became apparent that community policing would have a tremendous impact to deter terrorists operations.   Check points on the roads entering the cities would be a good starting point, while manpower and resource intensive it would also serve to reduce crime in those cities. Random patrols inside and outside of the cities would also be useful in disrupting terrorists activities. Community policing should be seen as a banding together by groups that will most likely be targeted by terrorists. Where threatened groups like hospitals, schools, churches and businesses form alliances and work together to eliminate Boko Haram's soldiers and financial supporters. While building and arming a city or regionally based militia can be a two edged sword, sometimes it is the lessor of the two evils when a community is fighting for its very survival.

Private security managers can and should share information with local law enforcement, if it is safe to do so. With private security managers most likely being better trained than their Nigerian law enforcement counterparts and a mentoring type of relationship could be developed which would be mutually beneficial to both groups.

Attacks on Religion

There were 40 terrorist's attacks on religious leaders, churches, mosques and religious schools according to the Global Terrorism Database. 40% of the attacks were by bombings and 37% were by armed assaults. Some of the assassinations and attacks on private citizens and property coded in the Global Terrorism Database could have also been coded as attacks on religious figures and institutions.

The bombings ranged from car bombs parked next to a church, religious school or church sponsored hospital to explosives being tossed through open windows during church services. In several cases of church bombings suicide bombers walked through the front doors and detonated their vests in the middle of the church membership. Concentric ring theory would have provided enough standoff distance in the car bombings and thrown explosive attacks. While fixed and roving security or observant church goers could have discouraged any suicide bombers from attempting to penetrate the church facilities.   Roving security patrols are always helpful in that the unpredictability of the security patrols also serve as a deterrent for terrorists.

The armed assaults were extremely violent in nature with gunmen rushing into churches firing machine guns and welding machetes against their victims. The attackers would enter the church and attack the worshipping congregation and when the worshippers ran fleeing the violence they would be ambushed by the rest of the attackers. With community policing efforts structured to prevent crime the overall criminality that supports the terrorists would also be reduced, which would lower crime and improve the quality of life for all Nigerians.

The Religion of Peace estimates the number of dead Christians in Nigeria since 9/11 to be around 3,459. Their deaths ranged from beheading and throat cuttings to being hacked to death or set on fire (The Religion of Peace, 2013). The group has built up an extensive database of

Christian deaths around the world using the same open sourced media websites that the Global Terrorism Database does. While the Religion of Peace group focuses on Muslim's violence against Christians, one can only wonder why this category of terrorism was left out of a government funded database. So when "37 Christians in four villages are slaughtered by Muslim raiders" (The Religion of Peace, 2013) for not paying the jizya "tax". Jizya is basically a tax Christians and Jews have levied against them to mark their submission to Muslims (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). Two Coptic Christians were shot to death for refusing to pay taxes to Islam in Nigeria in September (The Religion of Peace, 2013). In Boko Haram controlled areas the extremist Muslims can walk up and demand jizya from any Christian or Jew. If the Muslims have enough weapons or enough men with them they will most likely walk away with something for their efforts.

A good example of this type of jizya extortion is when members of the Muslim Brotherhood recently captured an entire Coptic village in Egypt and "the Muslim brotherhood and its supporters have begun forcing the roughly 15,000 Christian Copts of Dalgo village in Egypt to pay jizya tax" with families unable to pay being assaulted or murdered (Chasmar, 2013).

Community policing would be very useful in that as soon as a group of Muslims begin shaking down Christians for jizya payments an armed groups of Christians could drive them from the area. Today collecting jizya is more comparable to strong armed robbery, extortion or just an excuse for brutalizing Christians. When jizya was original collected it was a method of raising money by taxing Christians so the caliphates could wage jihad, which is war against the non-believers or Christian and Jews. Now days "the practice is occurring in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Sudan" (Daniels, 2013).

Attacks on Businesses and Organizations

Terrorist attacks on businesses in the Global Terrorism Database are broken down in a rather unconventional. Attacks on oil company pipelines and oil distribution centers are coded as an attack on a "utility" target, instead of an attack on a business. The majority of attacks on businesses are kidnappings, which range from workers stationed on an offshore oil platform to a single worker in a store being kidnapped. In several cases employees inside the targeted business were actually part of the attacking force, which opens the companies up to lawsuits (Dow, 2001), Steven Dow, a noted writer on legal liability for security companies, calls for more standardization in building and designing employee manuals, which would limit the victim company's liability by showing that the employee or attacker was acting outside of the scope of their "normal duties". While kidnappings were the most common attacks against businesses, bombings and armed attacks also occurred frequently.


Figure 3 Method of Attacks on Businesses and Organizations from the Global Terrorism Database.

Attacks on the Nigerian Government

Terrorist attacks on the Nigerian Government accounted for 88 of the total Global Terrorism Database events. Bombings were the most used method of attack and were used 34% of the time for a total of 30 bombings. Armed assaults came in second with 26% of the attacks involving one or more terrorists attacking a government facility and these attacks accounted for 24 of the terrorist's attacks. Assassinations were recorded in 22% of the attacks against the Nigerian government with 18 actual events. Hostage taking or kidnapping occurred 11% of the time or in 10 separate events.   Facility and infrastructure attacks accounted for 6% of the attacks with six actual events, with 1% of the events having no incident summary for analysis.

The vast majority of the government attacks were more in the nature of assassinations on people holding public office. The difference between an armed assault and an assassination is vague at best in the Global Terrorism Database. While a group of attackers throwing dynamite at a home can be classified as an assassination in one instance, three gunmen killing a protocol officer is considered an armed assault in another.

The majority of the attacks on high ranking people in public office were at their homes. A small number of attacks could be classified as targets of opportunity, for example a government assessment team surveying flood damage was captured and beheaded (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2012).

On December 2, 2013, an estimated force between 200 to 300 Boko Haram militants attacked the Composite Group Air Force base in Maiduguri, the Maiduguri International Airport and other targets. While the causalities are still in dispute at least 100 Boko Haram members were killed in the military air strikes (Marama, 2013) that finally drove off the Boko Haram attackers.

Attacks on the Nigerian Government

Figure 4 Attacks on the Nigerian Government from the Global Terrorism Database.

   The problem with protecting government officials and their staffers in Nigeria is there are too many people to protect and the government can't protect them all. Just arming government officials with a pistol would go a long way in keeping them and their families safe. The problem is when terrorists can mobilize and equip 300 fighters and attack government facilities then the terrorists have become a significant threat to Nigeria's sovereignty.

Attacks on Education

   Attacks on education targets are particularly troubling as they damage the institutions for education, but more importantly kill and injure a community's best and brightest citizens. While educational facilities only suffered six recorded attacks in the Global Terrorism Database the attacks accounted for 84 children, adults and teachers losing their lives and in one attack in 2009, 75 people lost their lives (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses

to Terrorism (START), 2012). Abubakar Shekau, the current leader of Boko Haram has "encouraged militants to kill teachers and administrators of schools that teach subjects like English, math and science" (Murdock, 2013). Since both Christian and Muslim schools have been targeted by Boko Haram many local villagers are beginning to band together to actively hunt and kill Boko Haram members (Vanguard, 2013). To quote Abudakar Mallum, the leader of a group of vigilantes in Maiduguri, "It is too late for them [Boko Haram] because the battle line has been drawn and there is no going back" (Vanguard, 2013). When the average citizen rises up and begins actively engaging terrorists then the citizens have taken the first step toward securing their freedom from oppression.

One of the problems with protecting children and the same applies here in America is there is a mistaken belief that children are "automatically safe" inside of a school. The same thought process also takes place inside of churches and hospitals, but these locations actually makes the children a more attractive target for mentally ill persons, criminals and terrorists.


Figure 18 Attacks on Education from the Global Terrorism Database.

So the schools in Nigeria as in America need to employ an aggressive security presence in order to keep a community's most precious resource, their children safe.

Attacks on Hospitals

Hospital attacks in Nigeria are very common and do much to intimidate the local communities. Only two attacks on hospitals were recorded in the Global Terrorism Database. The first attack involved gunmen shooting into a teaching hospital killing a police officer and two civilians. The other more notable event was the kidnapping of Dr. Michael Ibadin, Chief Medical Director of the University of Benin Teaching Hospital. Dr. Ibadin's case is unique in that after he was kidnapped on his way to work, "the Chairman of the Nigerian Medical Association ordered all medical and dental practitioners to withdraw from practice in the state of Edo, where the kidnapping occurred, until Dr. Ibadin was released alive" (huhuonline, 2010). This action did two very important things to help Dr. Ibadin survive, first it put a great deal of pressure on the kidnappers to keep Dr. Ibadin alive and second by withdrawing medical services to an entire state, Edo's law enforcement community was forced into action in order to save face.

Boko Haram's attacks on hospitals are designed to intimidate the civilian population and add to the misery of the average Nigerian. The attacks also drive off the more intelligent and affluent members of the community, namely the doctors, nurses and hospital administrators, which helps the region to descend quicker into poverty.   Unfortunately while Boko Haram's strategy seems flawed to a rational person, it is actually highly effective. Affluent and intelligent people are a serious threat to Boko Haram so Boko Haram goes to great lengths to intimidate, kill or drive them from the region. Community based policing would be highly effective as these groups of Boko Haram attackers can be somewhat large and easy to spot as they assemble prior to an attack. Preparation is the best way to win a battle as once an attack begins it is already too late to

be decisive. Key infrastructure needs to be fortified before an attack begins, this frees up forces

to deploy and help defeat the attackers. With proper fortifications fewer forces are needed and

more forces can be "in the fight".   While sounding easy in theory, it actually takes a great deal

of planning, resources, training and constant communications to effectively achieve dominance

during an attack.   During combat operations the police and military have to maintain security

and control over the regional hospitals to support their own wounded and dying, otherwise the

hospitals are a very tempting target to terrorists. Attacking a hospital while it is full of wounded

during a battle is an excellent tactic to help spread the "fog of war" and overload an opponent's

command and control center. This is very easy to do in urban warfare as the defenders are

already struggling to react to a fast moving urban fight along multiple fronts. If a suicide bomber

will drive into a bus stop in Nigeria and detonate their car bomb (Ibukun & Rabiu, 2013), what's

to stop a suicide bomber from waiting for a hospital to fill up with casualties and blowing them

up? Just killing several doctors and nurses and adding to the confusion of an attack is worth the

price of a car bomb and a willing bomber.

V. DISCUSSION

Modern Communications in a Conflict Zone

On 14 May 2013 a "declaration of a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, three

states in northern Nigeria began. All telecommunications in these states was shut down and then

on "19 June the military extended the telecommunications ban to include satellite phones in

Borno state" (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Database

(IRIN), 2003). Later in June, 2013 the "Joint Task Force seized Boko Haram's online video

equipment, laptop computers, rockets and rocket launchers and GSM phones" (Omonobi, 2013).

Boko Haram is technically savvy enough to produce and post their own propaganda videos on

YouTube and send them to Nigerian news and media outlets. So it stands to reason that Boko Haram is technically savvy enough to search the internet for targets and use internet satellite software to plan out their attacks. Most likely Boko Haram also uses the web to gather information about targets and even build "target folders" on potential sites, complete with key personnel files on the targeted organization. Boko Haram's soldiers regularly "use mobile phones in Nigeria to communicate and even send emails to share information with the media" (Nweke, 2011). In addition to mobile phone usage there is also reported use of Short Messaging Service (SMS) or "texting" between Boko Haram members as well (Nweke, 2011), which adds a new dimension to their communications capabilities.

How to Defeat the Enemies use of Modern Communications

Nigerian security forces need to understand and better exploit the role that modern communications now plays in a conflict zone. Communications is termed as a combat multiplier because it enhances a group's offensive or defensive efforts. Basically in a conflict zone the side with the best communications skills wins the fight. Offensive and defensive operations are typically broken down into three components, i.e. the ability to shoot, move and communicate. So if Boko Haram has better communications than the force they are fighting then they win the fight.

One of India's intelligence victories was during the Mambai terrorist attacks on November 26, 2008, which is referred to in India as "26/11" (Ians, 2009). During the Mumbai attacks India Intelligence agents were able to listen in on the phone calls made from the Mumbai terrorists to their handlers. LeT was the terrorist group that attacked Mumbai in November of 2008, with an American LeT operative named David Headley conducting the reconnaissance for the attacks (Fair, Ghosh, Jamal, Rassler & Shoeb, 2013, p.3).

The terrorist's handlers were relaying real time tactical information about police and military locations to the terrorists (Ians, 2009). Richard Watson of the British Broadcasting Corporation quoted an exchange translated from the tape:

(Terrorist in Nariman House) *"Is there anyone in our building?"*

(Terrorist controller) *"Look at the terrace at the back - the police are there. There's a building under construction, they're on top of that building and there's a lot of police on the main road."* (Ians, 2009).

This meant that Lashkar-e-Taiba had lookouts pre-positioned before the attack that were spotting for the attackers during the attack. With their lookouts in place the attackers could avoid armed resistance while murdering innocent civilians and the lookouts were able to notify their controllers when the attackers were captured or killed.

Now the complexity and the logistics of the Mumbai attack grows in scope as not only did the attackers have to be resourced but also their lookout teams. While the attackers arrived by speedboat across the harbor, the lookouts had to be pre-positioned several days in advance around the target locations to help the terrorists be successful. The attacking force was able to land by speedboats because the lookouts had determined the attackers landing area was secured. This also meant more new faces, more foot traffic and an increase in telecommunications traffic in the targeted areas. Unfortunately twenty or thirty extra phone calls before the Mumbai attack would have went unnoticed even if they were international placed phone calls going to the same number.

Instead of disabling all telecommunications in the northern states of Nigeria, the government should be analyzing calling patterns off of the cell towers and triangulating phone locations for possible terrorist camps. With this skill set security analysts could begin predicting the next

terrorist attacks based on telecommunications traffic. When the Nigerian government shuts down all telecommunications for three entire states it also hurts businesses and ordinary citizens that depend on telecommunications. A telecommunication blackout also reduces the effectiveness of community policing efforts to include the impact on private security managers that are now left blind and deaf to any tactical situations.

Security managers would do well to add AM or HAM radios to their command centers as the AM and HAM radios are not dependent on private or public infrastructure to operate. So if the government or terrorists shuts down all telecommunications in your region, your company can continue to operate. Today's AM and HAM radio models can also encrypt data and send secure emails to receiving radios much as computers do today. Another great addition to any security manager's command and control center is several police band and radio scanners. The thought process is if the terrorists use walkie-talkies to coordinate their attacks then the scanners will pick their transmissions. The upside to global positioning walkie-talkies is that any monitoring station can also pickup their location, so an alert security manager would be able to plot any terrorist's attacks. With the loss of revenue and hardships imposed on the citizens by the Nigerian government, many citizens, especially Muslims, will begin to wonder if they would not fair better under Boko Haram's control. Most security managers would see the situation as untenable in the northern states and would begin urging their employer to leave Nigeria.

Recommendations to Defeat Boko Haram

The Council on Foreign Relations has only recently begun to think of Boko Haram as a jihadist insurgency, but has yet to include Boko Haram in the council's "Invisible Armies Insurgency Tracker". The Counsel's information on Boko Haram is extremely sparse in detail (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). If the Council was to incorporate data from all the

existing databases they could conceivable develop a substantial database that could help set international policy in Nigeria for years to come, however this is doubtful as they have decided to create their own informational database.

Using Boko Haram's Time Schedule to Defeat them

Boko Haram is pretty predictable when it comes to attacks, for example Christian and Muslim holidays and especially local and national elections. Economist Jose Garcia-Montalvo has shown through a historical perspective that terrorism actually does affect the election process (Garcia-Montalvo, 2007). The results from Garcia-Montalvo's study on terrorist's attacks are that the more moderate candidates are elected after an attack. The thought process of the voters appears to be one of appeasement to the attackers so they won't attack again. This is how terrorists shape national policy by forcing citizens to elect the candidates that the terrorists want. Then finally over time this is how the extremists take over an existing government or "shape the field" so more sympathetic officials are in power.

So by anticipating state and national elections and religious holidays security managers can better plan for future attacks. So when terrorists begin working issues like resourcing, training and surveillance on potential targets, security managers can be ready for them and can conduct their own counter-surveillance measures.

Stopping the Recruitment Cycle of Child Soldiers

The best way to stop the recruitment cycle of child soldiers into Boko Haram is to give as many children as possible an education and a chance for a better future. Normally there are three ways out of poverty either through crime, hard work or through education. Crime is the easiest way for short term gains, hard work is only possible if the person has the opportunities and education is the hardest way as the resources and education facilities have to be available to the

student. This is why Muslim terrorist groups target educational facilities as the more uneducated people are and the poorer these people are, the easier it is to control them. Education is known as the great equalizer and it is normally the first step in acquiring generational wealth, which is wealth or social status that is passed on through generations of the same family, which lifts the family out of poverty. The opposite of generational wealth is generational poverty, which can be passed on by committing crimes, drug use and other types of mutually destructive pursuits. So to seize an easy opportunity to generate goodwill and regional security, the foreign company should have several educational programs aimed at the children of employees and the many local Nigerian orphans in the area. Most companies already have the facilities in place to accommodate schools and the price of running a school is very cheap compared to the damage an attack could do.

Medical care also helps break the poverty cycle as it saves lives and improves the quality of life of people afflicted with a host of easily cured illnesses. Most foreign companies already provide doctors and medical support to their employees so expanding their services to help the neighboring villages and towns is pretty easy and generates goodwill and regional security. The cost of the medical services is a small price to pay when providing medical services helps keep the region stable and the foreign company profitable.

Security Management in Theory for Organizations in a Conflict Zone

Security managers have three important security tools at their disposal; defensible spaces theory, management by exception or "metrics" and risk mitigation procedures. All three of these security tools help a security manager safeguard lives, property and protect the organization's reputation. Defensible spaces theory seeks to understand the where and who (Newman, 1996) of

crime, whereas metrics help security managers determine the likelihood of an attack and then

risk management seeks to mitigate losses before, during and after the attack.

Oscar Newman originally developed defensible spaces theory in the 1970's (Newman, 1996)

to reduce urban crime. However in a conflict zone defensible spaces theory takes on a much

more urgent priority as Oscar Newman most likely didn't anticipate car bombs, armed assaults or

even suicide bombers.   An actual attack will use the violated principals of defensible space as a

combat multiplier to aid the attacking force. So the rationalization in a conflict zone should be,

if a car can park next to the company headquarter then we can expect a car bomb in the near

future.

In the post 9/11security paradigm defensible spaces theory in a conflict zone also includes

vehicle bomb standoff distances and even incorporates components of concentric ring theory.

While practices and procedures in the security management world now also includes fire

suppression systems, rehearsed evacuation procedures, enterprise security and many other safety

and security measures, defensible spaces theory is still the basis for defense.

Security managers must have control over who accesses their facility in order to secure the

facility as not all "evil doers" will be terrorists, many will be average criminal types and

competitors on spy missions. Either through the erecting of barriers, fencing off compounds and

creating a comprehensive security plan for their organization security managers must be allowed

to do their jobs. Training for the security force and for the regular employees must be based on

surviving multiple failures at once. The concept behind this is a complex enemy attack will

evolve several pre-planned parts, such as a ground attack with the security forces radio's being

jammed or multiple car bombs with snipers on buildings that are waiting for first responders.

The enemy will only attack after they have "shaped" the battlefield so they can win a decisive

victory over their opponent. Security managers need to practice for multiple failures and for key command and control centers to be disabled early on in the fight as command and control centers are high priority targets for enemy forces.

Community Policing for Organizations in a Conflict Zone

Soon after every new security manager takes over a location in a conflict zone they begin looking around at other foreign organizations to see how they interact with the locals and each other. They examine forms of "mutual aid" to fellow companies and sometimes these agreements have already been in place for years. Most security managers understand that it's not if an attack will occur, but when the attack will occur, so reaching out to other companies early on is a sign of strength not weakness. It is easier to join forces early on and share intelligence and training than to beg for help when your facilities are being overrun by jihadists.

Normally in a foreign country the foreigner's will develop an "us against them" mentality. The problem is when this mentality develops it tends to overshadow the safe and mutually supportive relationships that have existed in the past. Here is where a variation of community policing becomes every effective. While the security manager needs to maintain strict operational security for the company and the company's employees, they also have an opportunity to help stabilize their region.   This is done by bringing in more locals and putting them to work and the economic gains that flow between the company and the locals' helps to stabilize the region. Just by hiring locals to cut back the vegetation from the security fences strengthens existing ties to the community. While the newly hired workers are undergoing safety training the security manager can also exploit their knowledge of the region, maybe offer rewards and other incentives to share security concerns with their new employer.

One of the problems during Operation Iraq Freedom was instead of working with Iraqi's to teach them capitalism, which is what many of them wanted, U.S. forces side stepped the economy completely. The lesson learned in Iraq was to spread the wealth around and work with local businesses and teach them how to expand and grow. While more work for the foreign staff at first, the payoff is a human intelligence network dedicated to helping the foreign company survive, grow and thrive.

One of the subjects not discussed in the Global Terrorism Database was industrial espionage. Industrial espionage in a conflict zone can range from passive intelligence gathering from competitors to full blown surveillance by industrial spies. Normally security in foreign locations is more susceptible to higher level attacks than here in the United States. The downside to weak security is the same security environment that lets criminals steal from you, is the same environment that lets spies spy on you and terrorists attack you. So the unlocked gate in a raw materials yard which lets thieves enter is the same unlocked gate that terrorists run through while shooting employees. Even worse it's the same gate the car bomb drives through before plowing into your corporate headquarters or large high octane fuel tank. In a conflict zone loss of profitability because of enhanced security is preferable to loss of life. Security experts must get out of their offices and observe and question all that goes on in their companies (Mendell, 2011).

While community policing goes a long way toward reducing crime the government itself also plays an enormous role in safe-guarding Nigerians and foreign companies from attack. Even the United States and the rest of the world have begun taking an interest in the killings in Nigeria.

Pre-Attack Metrics that Forecast Large Scale Attacks

To quote John Duffey, a Homeland Security consultant, "There are five elements to every terrorist attack. These elements are (1) Target Identification, (2) Intelligence Gathering and

Planning, (3) Logistics and Training, (4) Rehearsals or "Dry Runs," and (5) the physical manifestation of the attack itself". "These are the five elements of a terrorist attack and they are universal," according to John Duffey. "Virtually every terrorist attack that has and will take place follows these elements in the presented order. Three of these elements can be detected if the observer knows what they are looking at and has a means of reporting the observation to the appropriate authority." (Duffey, 2009) This speaks to the heart of community policing and monitoring security metrics in the company, the surrounding area and in the city in general. Just monitoring crime reports in the local newspapers and working with the local police stations pays off big in organizational security.

Pre-attack metrics are just one of the many daily worries of a Nigerian based security manager. Another set of oddities that need to be monitored are an unusual amount of locals not coming to work and odd crimes occurring in and around the organization that could be in preparation of an attack. Events like electric power poles being cut down or vehicles blocking exits and entrances can both be indicators of an imminent attack. Another important metric is attacks on other foreign businesses in the conflict zone as normally if one business is attacked there are more attacks coming in the immediate future. Here again having a strong mutual aid and alert program in place prior to any attacks is vital for mutual protection and security and for search and rescue operations after an attack has occurred.

In Carol Garbo's book "Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for strategic warning", the number one reason for failing to anticipate an attack was "inadequate examination of the evidence". This was followed by "inadequate understanding of evidence or precedent" as the second biggest failure. This speaks to a lack of training within the security force and a lack of communications across the organization (Garbo, 2002, p.163) and throughout the organization.

Cyber Security in a Conflict Zone

While armed assaults, kidnappings and bombings were frequently used by Muslim terrorists there were no statistics on cyber-attacks inside of Nigeria. Enterprise vulnerability is a growing threat both domestically and from foreign threats that are sympathetic to the Boko Haram cause, like Iran and China. While attacks on enterprise networks are more sophisticated than sending out kids on motorcycles with machine guns, those same kids, if computer literate can destroy a company and never leave their house. While information security management life cycle (ISMLC) makes most people's eyes glaze over, a security manager needs to take heed of the basics to lock down their information systems (Nyanchama, 2005). In today's world an accidentally exposed calendar for a high value executive could provide enough information to disrupt a company's operations for weeks or months, if not years. Most businesses put routine information like maintenance and security schedules on their intranet servers, which are servers only used by employees. Even intranet servers can leak information through faulty user permissions, unsecured laptops and even hacked mobile computing devices. So the security manager and the information system's manager need to work closely together in order to maintain strict security protocols.

Capitalism Equals Security

Very few people start a revolution, join an insurgency or even commit crime when they have the opportunity to make honest money.   The problem with Nigeria as in other socialist countries is that socialists see only one small national economic "pie" with a limited number of pieces. So instead of seeing solutions to problems, socialists only want to fight for a larger piece of the diminishing economic "pie".   Capitalists see the national economic "pie" as ever expanding as markets expand and shrink due to natural forces occurring with their economy. So based on the

pursuit of profit or a capitalist agenda then most nations are relatively immune to homegrown extremists Muslims, however once a country begins to make the slide toward a Muslim majority, and socialist countries are particularly susceptible to this, then the capitalists face an uphill battle.

In Nigeria the Muslims are slowly destroying both domestic and foreign businesses in northern Nigeria in order to push their radical Islamic agenda. The problem with this tactic is it only generates short term wealth, normally through the looting after the attack, while the real profits which are the company's future earnings, are lost forever. The real problem is once extremists Muslims begin killing people they can't stop and their whole social system de-evolves into complete anarchy.

In order to maintain security in a region capitalism has to be allowed to flourish and grow. As more domestic businesses go through the business life cycle employment levels raise and the crime rate will drop. As the crime rate drops more money can be invested into infrastructure building projects which in turn further stimulates the economy. Unfortunately the shift from socialism to capitalism in a country like Nigeria takes years to accomplish, just as the change from capitalism to socialism takes years to accomplish.

Conclusion

Many will say that Nigeria shares no commonality with the United States and that comparing Nigeria to America is foolhardy at best. However given the growth in America's own federal government, the loss of doctors, the growing trends toward socialism and the growing Muslim population in America it does give rational people pause for thought. Just the section on elections and terrorism should scare voters because terrorism does affect election outcomes.

Security managers need to be building more secure facilities and developing their own community policing partnerships now, before the next wave of terrorist attacks happen on our

soil. Too many people have already died in Nigeria for security managers in Nigeria and

America not to stop and take notice. It's just a matter of time before terrorism becomes the norm

in America just as it is in Nigeria, Israel, England, France and Russia.

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